CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FIFTH AMENDMENT-ACT OF PRODUCTION DOCTRINE DOES NOT APPLY To CORPORATE CUSTO-

DIANS-Braswell v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 2284 (1988).

The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "[n]o person shall be compelled in any criminal case to
be a witness against himself."' Over a century ago, the United
States Supreme Court interpreted this amendment to prohibit
the compelled production of a party's private books and papers
to convict him of a crime. 2 That reading of the fifth amendment,
however, has been severely restricted by subsequent judicial interpretation.' While once viewed as protecting a fundamental
I U.S. CONST. amend. V.
2 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). The Boyd Court held that members of a partnership may not be compelled to produce documents when the contents of those documents may personally incriminate the individual, because such
an exercise would violate an individual's fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Id. at 634-35. The Boyd Court's analysis focused on a content-based
privacy standard. See id. at 630. Indeed, Justice Bradley, writing for the majority,
linked the fourth and fifth amendments, stating that "we have been unable to perceive that the seizure of a man's private books and papers to be used in evidence
against him is substantially different from compelling him to be a witness against
himself." Id. at 633.
One commentator has suggested that this privacy rationale underlying Boyd
was utilized in an attempt to preserve common law property rights. Note, Formalism, Legal Realism, and ConstitutionallyProtectedPrivacy Under the Fourthand Fifth Amendments, 90 HARV. L. REV. 945, 951-64 (1977). These common law property rights,
along with an individual's privilege against self-incrimination, formed an "impenetrable boundary around the individual's sphere of privacy .... Id. at 955. For a
more detailed analysis of the Boyd decision, see infra notes 26-34 and accompanying
text.
3 See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 407 (1976) ("Several of Boyd's express or implicit declarations have not stood the test of time.").
Two distinct legal propositions, each with its own line of cases, have contributed to the erosion of fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination subsequent to Boyd. The first is that line of cases which utilize the content-based privacy
rationale enunciated in Boyd to limit an individual's privacy rights in subpoenaed
documents belonging to an organization. Known as the collective entity rule, this
doctrine stands for the proposition that neither an organization, nor an individual
acting on its behalf, may refuse to produce documents on the grounds that their
contents may be personally incriminating. See Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85,
93 (1974) ("[P]artnerships may and frequently do represent organized institutional
activity so as to preclude any claim of Fifth Amendment privilege with respect to
the partnership's financial records."); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973)
(taxpayer may not assert fifth amendment privilege to challenge summons directed
to her accountant requiring production of taxpayer's books and records which were
in the accountant's possession); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944) (officer
of labor union may not refuse to produce union records on the grounds that they
are personally incriminating); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911) (corporate representative cannot assert an individual fifth amendment privilege to resist a
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property right in the contents of one's private papers,4 the fifth
amendment presently is regarded as a safeguard against the process of compelling their production. 5
The erosion of the fifth amendmept privilege is particularly
evident in the corporate context. 6 Indeed, the Court has long
maintained that a custodian of records may not resist a subpoena
to produce corporate records on the grounds that their contents
may be personally incriminating. 7 The Court, however, has preserved a limited personal protection for non-corporate custodians of records when the act of producing certain documents
would have testimonial incriminating aspects.8 Recently, in Braswell v. United States,9 the Court refused to afford corporate representatives even the limited protection still granted other
individuals under the fifth amendment by holding the act of production doctrine inapplicable to corporate custodians.' 0 Hence,
subpoena to produce corporate documents which may be personally incriminating); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906) (corporation does not enjoy fifth amendment privileges).
The second line of cases which has contributed to the erosion of fifth amendment principles commenced in 1976 when the Court embarked on a new standard
for fifth amendment analysis in document production cases which effectively eradicated all previous content-based scrutiny. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391
(1976). In Fisher, the Court determined that fifth amendment analysis should not
focus on whether the contents of the subpoenaed documents are personally incriminating but, whether the compelled production of documents is testimonial and
personally incriminating to the individual. Id. at 408. Known as the act of production doctrine, or compelled testimony standard, inquiry is based not on whether
the documents listed in the subpoena are private, but instead the Court must determine if the acts required of the individual would result in compelled testimonial
evidence. Id. at 409. See also Note, OrganizationalPapers and the PrivilegeAgainst SelfIncrimination, 99 HARV. L. REV. 640, 644 (1986) ("In analyzing a fifth amendment
claim ... a court must ask two questions: Did the government compel any incriminating evidence? If so, was the evidence testimonial in nature?").
Subsequently, in United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605 (1984), the Court reaffirmed the Fisher act of production analysis and extended it to sole proprietorships.
Id. at 610-12. The Court also reaffirmed the Fisher analysis which held that private
papers are not protected by the fifth amendment unless they involve compelled
testimony. Id. Because the papers in Doe were voluntarily prepared, the Court
ruled that they were not protected by the fifth amendment. See id. at 611-12.
4 See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
5 See, e.g., United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605 (1984); Fisher v. United States,
425 U.S. 391 (1976):
6 See Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911) (custodian may not assert his
individual fifth amendment privilege to refuse to produce documents which may be
personally incriminating); see also Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906) (corporations
do not enjoy fifth amendment protections).
7 See infra notes 34-45 and accompanying text.
8 See Doe, 465 U.S. at 612-14; Fisher, 425 U.S. at 408-11.
9 108 S. Ct. 2284 (1988).
10 Id. at 2292.
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an individual may be compelled, in his role as custodian, to produce corporate documents even where the act of production
might incriminate that individual personally."
Randy Braswell was in the business of purchasing and selling
equipment, land and timber, as well as oil and gas leases.' 2 In
1980, Braswell restructured his business from a sole proprietorship to a Mississippi closed corporation, entitled Worldwide Machinery Sales, Inc.' 3 One year later, Braswell established a
second Mississippi corporation, Worldwide Purchasing, Inc.,
which he financed with the 100% interest he held in Worldwide
Machinery Sales, Inc.' 4 Braswell was the sole shareholder in each
corporation. 15
A federal grand jury sitting in the Southern District of Mississippi issued a subpoena compelling Braswell to produce the
books and records of the two corporations.' 6 The subpoena did
not require Braswell to testify, but instead directed him to deliver
the documents to the serving agent.' 7 Braswell moved to quash
the subpoena on fifth amendment grounds, claiming that the
mere act of producing the documents would have incriminating
testimonial aspects. 18
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
Mississippi denied the motion to quash.' 9 In an unpublished
opinion, the district court held Braswell in contempt for refusing
to comply with the subpoena, concluding that the records of any
corporation, regardless of its size, are not entitled to fifth amendI I See id.
12

Id. at 2286.

'3
14

Id.
Id.

Id. Both corporations kept regular books and records as required by law. Id.
In addition, each filed separate tax returns. Id. Pursuant to Mississippi law, each
corporation had three directors: Braswell, his wife, and his mother. Id. Braswell,
however, maintained sole control and authority over each corporation's business
affairs. Id.
16 Id. The subpoena required the following documents to be produced:
receipts and disbursement journals; general ledger and subsidiaries; accounts receivable/accounts payable ledgers, cards, and all customer
data; bank records of savings and checking accounts, including statements, checks, and deposit tickets; contracts, invoices-sales and
purchase-conveyances, and correspondence; minutes and stock books
and ledgers; loan disclosure statements and agreements; liability ledgers; and retained copies of Forms 1120, W-2, W-4, 1099, 940 and 941.
Id. at 2286 n.1.
17 Id. at 2286.
15

18

Id.

19 Id.
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ment protection. 20 Accordingly, the court determined that Braswell, as the custodian of the two corporations, was not entitled to
invoke the privilege. 2 ' The United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that an individual does not enjoy fifth amendment protection from producing documents belonging to a collective entity.22
Recognizing a need to resolve a split in the circuits 2 3 the
Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1987.24 The majority determined that corporate records are not privileged and that agents
possessing such documents hold them in a representative rather
than personal capacity. 25 Thus, the Court declared that corporate representatives, such as Braswell, may not resist a subpoena
to produce records regardless of whether the act of production
may personally incriminate them.2 6
To appreciate the significance of Braswell, it is necessary to
trace the evolution of the Supreme Court's interpretation of the
fifth amendment in document production cases. The Court first
applied the fifth amendment to a court order requiring the production of documents in Boyd v. United States.2 7 The Boyd Court
determined that the fifth amendment proscribes the compulsory
20 In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Braswell), No. 86-198 slip op. at 1 (S.D. Miss.
Nov. 12, 1986), aff'd sub nom. In re GrandJury Proceedings (Doe), 814 F.2d 190 (5th

Cir. 1987) (per curiam), aff'd sub nom. Braswell v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 2284
(1988).
21 Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2286.
22 In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Doe), 814 F.2d 190, 192 (5th Cir. 1987) (citing
Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 88 (1974); Grant v. United States, 227 U.S. 74,
80 (1913)), aff'd sub nom. Braswell v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 2284 (1988).
23 The Sixth, Eighth, Ninth and Tenth Circuits have not recognized a fifth

amendment privilege based on the act of production analysis in corporate settings.
See, e.g., In re GrandJury Proceedings (Morganstern), 771 F.2d 143 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 1033 (1985); In re GrandJury Subpoena (85-W-71-5), 784 F.2d 857
(8th Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. See v. United States, 479 U.S. 811 (1986), cert. dism'd,

479 U.S. 1048 (1987); United States v. Malis, 737 F.2d 1511 (9th Cir. 1984); In re
GrandJury Proceedings (Vargas), 727 F.2d 941 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 819
(1984).

However, the Second, Third, Fourth, Eleventh and D.C. Circuits have

granted a fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination to custodians of corporate records when the act of production will personally incriminate them. See,
e.g., United States v. AntonioJ. Sancetta, M.D., P.C., 788 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1986); In

re GrandJury Matter (Brown), 768 F.2d 525 (3d Cir. 1985); United States v. Lang,
792 F.2d 1235 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 985 (1986); In re GrandJury No. 86-3

(Will Roberts Corp.), 816 F.2d 569 (11th Cir. 1987); In re Sealed Case, 832 F.2d
1268 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
24
25
26
27

Braswell v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 64 (1987).
Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2287, 2291.
Id. at 2292 (quoting Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 411-12 (1976)).
116 U.S. 616 (1886).
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production of an individual's private papers.2 8
,In Boyd, the United States brought an action for forfeiture
against a partnership for its failure to pay customs duties allegedly owed on a shipment of thirty-five cases of imported glass.2 9
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York ordered the petitioners to produce an invoice for a previous
shipment. 30 The petitioners complied, preserving their constitutional claim for appeal. 3 ' The circuit court upheld the subpoena,
but the Supreme Court reversed the decisions of the lower
courts, holding that the directive of the trial court violated the
fourth and fifth amendments.3 2 Focusing on the contents of the
papers at issue, the Court found that they were within a zone of
privacy surrounding the individual into which the government
could not penetrate. 3 1 Significantly, the Court made that deterId. at 634-35.
Id. at 617-18.
Id. at 618.
31 See id.
32 Id. at 634-35. The Court posited that an intimate relation existed between the
two amendments. Specifically, the Court reasoned that:
[Tihe "unreasonable searches and seizures" condemned in the Fourth
Amendment are almost always made for the purpose of compelling a
man to give evidence against himself, which in criminal cases is condemned in the Fifth Amendment; and compelling a man "in a criminal
case to be a witness against himself," which is condemned in the Fifth
Amendment, throws light on the question as to what is an "unreasonable search and seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
And we have been unable to perceive that the seizure of a man's private
books and papers to be used in evidence against him is substantially
different from compelling him to be a witness against himself.
Id. at 633.
33 Id. at 630. Justice Bradley, writing for the majority, derived that zone of privacy from the fourth and fifth amendments. Id. at 621-30. The Court stated that an
individual's common law property rights as well as the protections of the fourth
amendment, placed Boyd's papers beyond the reach of government seizure. Id. at
630. Justice Bradley found support for his fourth amendment holding by quoting
at length from Lord Camden's opinion in Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr.
1029 (1765), an English case concerning governmental seizure of private papers.
Boyd, 116 U.S. at 626-29 (citing Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1029 (1765)).
In Entick, Lord Camden ruled, on common law property grounds, that a person's
private papers were protected against unreasonable searches and seizures. Entick,
19 How. St. Tr. at 1067. Similarly, Justice Bradley stated that an individual was
protected by the fifth amendment from the government's use of an individual's
private papers to incriminate him, regardless of whether a fourth amendment violation existed. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 633. Justice Bradley summarized his analysis by
eloquently stating:
It is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers,
that constitutes the essence of the offence; but it is the invasion of his
indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty and private
property, where that right has never been forfeited by his conviction of
28
29
30
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mination without reference to the business form of the parties
asserting the privilege.3 4
Twenty years later, in Hale v. Henkel,3 5 the Court limited the
scope of Boyd by holding that a corporation could not assert a
fifth amendment privilege to resist a subpoena to produce corporate documents. 3 6 After discussing the differences between corporations and individuals, the Court stated that the fifth
amendment is exclusively a personal privilege unavailable to a
corporation.3 7 The Court reasoned that the corporate entity, as a
some public offence,-it is the invasion of this sacred right which underlies and constitutes the essence of Lord Camden's judgment. Breaking
into a house and opening boxes and drawers are circumstances of aggravation; but any forcible and compulsory extortion of a man's own
testimony or of his private papers to be used as evidence to convict him
of crime or to forfeit his goods, is within the condemnation of that judgment. In this regard the Fourth and Fifth Amendments run almost into
each other.
Id. at 630.
One commentator has noted that this passage has caused some minor confusion and varied interpretations. See Note, supra note 2, at 955-56. The author
maintained that Justice Bradley's statement did not mean that both amendments
were needed collectively to achieve the desired result. Id. at 955. Rather, these two
amendments overlap and independently protect a person's private books and papers from government seizures. Id. at 955-56.
34 See Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630.
35 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
36 Id. at 70.
37 Id. at 69-70. The Court stated:
[W]e are of the opinion that there is a clear distinction ... between an
individual and a corporation, and that the latter has no right to refuse to
submit its books and papers for an examination at the suit of the State.
The individual may stand upon his constitutional right as a citizen. He
is entitled to carry on his private business in his own way ....
He owes
no duty to the State or to his neighbors to divulge his business, or to
open his doors to an investigation, so far as it may tend to incriminate
him. He owes no such duty to the State, since he receives nothing therefrom, beyond the protection of his life and property. His rights are such
as existed by the law of the land long antecedent to the organization of
the State, and can only be taken from him by due process of law, and in
accordance with the Constitution. Among his rights are a refusal to incriminate himself, and the immunity of himself and his property from
arrest or seizure except under a warrant of the law.
Upon the other hand, the corporation is a creature of the State. It
is presumed to be incorporated for the benefit of the public. It receives
certain special privileges and franchises, and holds them subject to the
laws of the State and the limitations of its charter ....
Its rights to act as
a corporation are only preserved to it so long as it obeys the laws of its
creation. There is a reserved right in the legislature to investigate its
contracts and find out whether it has exceeded its powers. It would be a
strange anomaly to hold that a State, having chartered a corporation to
make use of certain franchises, could not in the exercise of its sover-
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creature of the state, was not38entitled to the individual protections of the fifth amendment.
Five years after Hale, in Wilson v. United States,39 the Court
held that a corporate representative could not assert an individual privilege against self-incrimination to resist a subpoena for
corporate documents which may be personally incriminating.40
Writing for the majority, Justice Hughes advanced two reasons in
support of that holding. 4 ' First, the Court recognized that a corporation can act only through its agents.4 2 Thus, permitting a
corporate representative to resist a corporate subpoena by asserting an individual fifth amendment privilege would effectively
shield all corporate records from public inspection.43 Secondly,
the Court stated that the officers had no reasonable expectation
of privacy with respect to the contents of the corporate documents.4 4 Specifically, the Court noted that a corporate officer
holds corporate records pursuant to a duty which he has voluntarily accepted.4 5 The Court therefore concluded that the state's
eignty inquire how these franchises had been employed, and whether
they had been abused, and demand the production of the corporate
books and papers for that purpose.
Id. at 74-75.
38 Id. The Court reasoned that "[wihile an individual may lawfully refuse to answer incriminating questions unless protected by an immunity statute, it does not
follow that a corporation, vested with special privileges and franchises, may refuse
to show its hand when charged with an abuse of such privileges." Id. at 75.
39 221 U.S. 361 (1911).
40 Id. at 385. In Wilson, a federal grand jury issued indictments against shareholders, directors and officers of United Wireless Telegraph Company, charging
them with mail fraud and conspiracy. Id. at 367. A subpoena duces tecum was
served on the company and Christopher C. Wilson, its president, requiring the production of business letters and telegrams pertinent to the investigation. Id. at 36768. Mr. Wilson refused to produce the documents, claiming that they contained
incriminating information necessary in the defense of his case. Id. at 369.
41 See id. at 376-86.
42 Id. at 376-77 (citing Commissioners v. Sellew, 99 U.S. 624, 627 (1878)).
43 Id. at 384-85. The Court held that "[tihe reserved power of visitation would
seriously be embarrassed, if not wholly defeated in its effective exercise, if guilty
officers could refuse inspection of the records and papers of the corporation." Id.
44 See id. at 380-82.
45 Id. at 381, 384-85. In accepting that corporate position, the Court stated that
the officer is deemed to have waived his or her fifth amendment privilege with respect to the contents of the records of the corporation. Id. at 381-82. The Court
reasoned:
The fundamental ground of decision in this class of cases, is that
where, by virtue of their character and the rules of law applicable to
them, the books and papers are held subject to examination by the demanding authority, the custodian has no privilege to refuse production
although their contents tend to [in]criminate him. In assuming their
custody he has accepted the incident obligation to permit inspection.
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power to inspect corporate books overrides the custodian's individual privacy interest enunciated in Boyd.4 6
In 1944, the Court in United States v. White, 4 7 synthesized the
holdings of Hale and Wilson and extended them to unincorporated associations.48 In White, the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania issued a subpoena to an
unincorporated labor union requiring it to produce certain business records.49 In enforcing the subpoena, the Court held that
an officer of a labor union could not refuse to produce union
documents even if the records incriminated him personally.50 In
so holding, the majority refused to afford fifth amendment
pro5
tection to the union representative on privacy grounds. '
The Court, drawing on Hale and Wilson, focused on the nature of the entity whose representatives were asserting the privilege.52 The Court established a test for determining the scope of
Id.
46 Id. at 385. See also Dreier v. United States, 221 U.S. 394 (1911) (companion
case to Wilson which held that corporate records must be produced even when subpoena was directed at the corporation's secretary).
47 322 U.S. 694 (1944).
48 Id. at 700-01.
49 Id. at 695. In White, a federal grand jury was conducting an investigation of
the Mechanicsburg Naval Supply Depot and issued a subpoena duces tecum to the
local union of operating engineers. Id. The subpoena demanded that the union
produce copies of its constitution, by-laws and documentation of the work-permit
fees. Id.
50 Id. at 699. Justice Murphy stated:
Since the privilege against self-incrimination is a purely personal one, it
cannot be utilized by or on behalf of any organization, such as a corporation. Moreover, the papers and effects which the privilege protects
must be the private property of the person claiming the privilege, or at
least in his possession in a purely personal capacity. But individuals,
when acting as representatives of a collective group, cannot be said to
be exercising their personal rights and duties nor to be entitled to their
purely personal privileges. Rather they assume the rights, duties and
privileges of the artificial entity or association of which they are agents
or officers and they are bound by its obligations. In their official capacity, therefore, they have no privilege against self-incrimination.
Id. (citations omitted).
51 Id. at 698-700. The Court reasoned that the requested records were open to
inspection and thus, the documents were not private to the union representative.
Id. at 699. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the documents "embod[ied] no
element of personal privacy," and the representatives could not object to their
compelled production. Id. at 700.
52 See id. at 699-701 (citing Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911); Hale v.
Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906)). The Court maintained that individuals, and not organizations, were protected by the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The Court reasoned that:
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the privilege enjoyed by an entity's representatives. 53 That test is
whether an "organization has a character so impersonal

. . .

that

it cannot be said to embody or represent the purely private or
personal interests of its constituents, but rather to embody their
common or group interests only."154 The Court concluded that

"[l]abor unions-national or local, incorporated or unincorpo55
rated-clearly meet that test."
Curcio v. United States56 signalled an important shift in the

Court's perception of the fifth amendment in document production cases. In Curcio, a union official received two separate subpoenas requiring him to produce and testify regarding certain
union documents. 57 Curcio refused to produce the subpoenaed
documents or testify as to their whereabouts.5 8 A unanimous
Court held that a representative of an entity can assert his individual fifth amendment privilege in refusing to respond to questions which may incriminate him personally. 59 Recognizing that
the questions propounded on Curcio sought information unrelated to the contents of the corporate documents,60 the Court
The fact that the state charters corporations and has visitorial powers over them provides a convenient vehicle for justification of governmental investigation of corporate books and records. But the absence
of that fact as to a particular type of organization does not lessen the
public necessity for making reasonable regulations of its activities effective, nor does it confer upon such an organization the purely personal
privilege against self-incrimination. Basically, the power to compel the
production of the records of any organization, whether it be incorporated or not, arises out of the inherent and necessary power of the federal and state governments to enforce their laws, with the privilege
against self-incrimination being limited to its historic function of protecting only the natural individual from compulsory incrimination
through his own testimony or personal records.
Id. at 700-01.
53 Id. at 701.
54 Id.
55 Id. The Court cited numerous reasons supporting its position that labor unions should not be afforded fifth amendment protections. Id. at 701-02. For instance, the Court noted that labor unions have their own constitutions, rules and
by-laws which control their existence and operation. Id. at 701. Additionally, the
Court stated that unions often own separate real and personal property. Id. at 702.
Indeed, the Court concluded that labor unions, much like corporations, are distinct
legal entities from their constituents, recognized as such under the law, and thus
cannot be afforded fifth amendment protection. Id. at 703-04.
56 354 U.S. 118 (1957).
57 Id. at 119.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 128.
60 Id. at 125. The following questions were asked of Curcio at the grand jury
proceeding concerning his knowledge of his union's books and records:
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concluded that he may not be compelled to condemn himself by
his own testimony. 6 '
By focusing upon the testimony sought from the custodian
rather than the contents of the subpoenaed documents, the
Curcio Court recognized that the fifth amendment may protect an
individual acting in a representative capacity.6 2 Unlike the prior
collective entity decisions which established that the contents of
corporate records cannot give rise to a personal privilege against
self-incrimination, the Curcio Court posited that such a privilege
may arise when a custodian is compelled to testify and produce
the documents. 63 In so ruling, Curcio implicitly suggested a fundamental change in the Court's fifth amendment analysis, from
the privacy concerns first enunciated in Boyd to the testimonial
compulsion element attendant to the act of production, which
was to occur 20 years later. 64
[H]ave you at any time been in custody of [the union's] books and
records?
Mr. Curcio, have you ever had possession of the books and records
of this local?
Did you have custody and control of these records last Thursday?
Do you have possession of those records or any of them today?
Do you have custody and control of any of those records today?
Where are any of those records today, if you know?
Who has any of those records today, if you know?
Where were any of these records or all of these records a week ago
Thursday?
Where were any of these records a week ago Saturday?
Where were any or all of these records a week ago last Monday?
Where were any or all of these records yesterday?
Where are any or all of these records today?
Who, if you know, had any or all of these records a week ago last
Saturday?
Who had any or all of these records a week ago yesterday?
Who has any or all of these records today?
Id. at 120 n.l.
61 Id. at 124. In conclusion, the Court stated that "forcing the custodian to testify orally as to the whereabouts of nonproduced records requires him to disclose
the contents of his own mind. He might be compelled to convict himself out of his
own mouth. That is contrary to the spirit and letter of the Fifth Amendment." Id.
at 128.
62 See id. at 124-28.
63 Id. at 125.
64 See id. The Court foreshadowed Fisher's act of production analysis by stating
that "[t]he custodian's act of producing books or records in response to a subpoena
duces tecum is itself a representation that the documents produced are those demanded by the subpoena." Id. See also Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 348
(1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("What is incriminating about the production of a
document in response to an order is not its contents, as one might have thought,
but the implicit authentication that the document is the one named in the order.").
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In Fisher v. United States,65 the Supreme Court again addressed the act of production issue initially recognized in Curcio.
The Fisher Court consolidated two factually similar cases 6 6 and
declared that the mere act of producing requested documents
may, in certain circumstances, violate an individual's fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination.6 7 The two cases arose
from Internal Revenue Service (IRS) investigations of certain individuals.6 8 The IRS served subpoenas on the taxpayers' attorneys requiring them to produce their clients' records which the
attorneys held pursuant to their fiduciary capacities. 6 9 The attorneys refused to comply with the subpoenas, asserting on behalf
of the taxpayers that the fourth and fifth amendment protections
as well as attorney-client privilege prohibited the documents'
compelled production. 70
Justice White, writing for the majority, held that the taxpay71
ers could not invoke a fifth amendment privilege in the subpoenaed documents. 72 Eschewing the privacy-based collective entity
rule espoused in Hale, Wilson and White, the Fisher Court focused
instead on the testimonial compulsion concerns first enunciated
in Curcio.73 The Court formulated radically new guidelines for
deciding document production cases.7 4 In particular, the Court,
in a literal interpretation of the fifth amendment, maintained that
65
66

425 U.S. 391 (1976).

70
71

Id. at 395.

United States v. Fisher, 500 F.2d 683 (3d Cir. 1974), aff'd, 425 U.S. 391
(1976); United States v. Kasmir, 499 F.2d 444 (5th Cir. 1974), rev'd sub nom. Fisher
v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
67 Fisher, 425 U.S. at 410.
68 Id. at 394-95.
69 Id.
Id. at 396-97. Although the subpoenas were directed to the attorneys, the
taxpayers' fourth and fifth amendment protections were asserted. Id. at 396. If the
fifth amendment would have protected the taxpayer from producing the subpoenaed documents, the Court noted that these same privileges would have accrued to
the taxpayers' attorneys. Id. The Court, however, was convinced that the taxpayers' privileges would not excuse the attorneys' compliance with the subpoena. Id.
72 Id. at 396-97.
73 Id. at 396. Justice White noted:
It is true that the Court has often stated that one of the several purposes
served by the constitutional privilege against compelled testimonial selfincrimination is that of protecting personal privacy.... But the Court
has never on any ground, personal privacy included, applied the Fifth
Amendment to prevent the otherwise proper acquisition or use of evidence which, in the Court's view, did not involve compelled testimonial
self-incrimination of some sort.
Id. at 399 (footnote omitted).
74 Id. at 397-411.
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three elements comprise the privilege: compulsion, 75 self-incrimination,76 and testimony.77 Justice White first analyzed whether
the information contained in the documents constituted compelled testimony which would incriminate the taxpayer. 78 The
Court explained that because the papers contained the testimony
of the accountants and not of the taxpayer, the testimonial ele79
ment necessary for a fifth amendment violation did not exist.
The majority thus stated that because the papers were voluntarily
prepared, the compulsion element necessary for a fifth amendment violation was also absent.80
More importantly, the Court announced that, in some cases,
the mere act of producing requested documents could constitute
a privileged testimonial act. 8 ' The Court reasoned that the production of documents could establish the subpoenaed party's
knowledge of the existence, possession and authenticity of the
papers. s 2 Applying those principles to the facts in Fisher, the
of the paCourt determined that the existence and possession
pers at issue were "foregone conclusion[s]."8a Additionally, the
75 See id. at 397.

See id. at 398.
See id. at 408. As Justice White wrote:
We cannot cut the Fifth Amendment completely loose from the
moorings of its language, and make it serve as a general protector of
privacy-a word not mentioned in its text and a concept directly addressed in the Fourth Amendment. We adhere to the view that the Fifth
Amendment protects against "compelled self-incrimination, not [the
disclosure of] private information."
Insofar as private information not obtained through compelled selfincrimination testimony is legally protected, its protection stems from
other sources-the Fourth Amendment's protection against seizures
without warrant or probable cause and against subpoenas which suffer
from "too much indefiniteness or breadth in the things required to be
'particularly described'...."
Id. at 401 (citations omitted) (footnotes omitted).
78 See id. at 408-09.
79 Id. at 409. The Court noted that the workpapers were prepared by the accountant and did not contain testimonial declarations of the taxpayer. Id.
80 Id. at 409-10.
81 See id. at 410. Justice White proclaimed:
The act of producing evidence in response to a subpoena nevertheless has communicative aspects of its own, wholly aside from the contents of the papers produced. Compliance with the subpoena tacitly
concedes the existence of the papers demanded and their possession or
control by the taxpayer. It also would indicate the taxpayer's belief that
the papers are those described in the subpoena.
Id.
82 Id. at 410-12.
76
77

83

Id. at 411.
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Court noted that production of the documents would not authenticate the documents because the taxpayers' accountants had actually authored them.84 Accordingly, the Court concluded that
the compelled production of the documents did not transgress
the fifth amendment because they did not involve testimonial
assertions .85
In 1984, the Supreme Court first applied the Fisher act of
production analysis to a sole proprietorship in United States v.
Doe.8 6 Doe involved a grand jury investigation of the respondent
who owned several sole proprietorships.8 7 The grand jury issued
five subpoenas to the respondent compelling him to produce all
financial and business records pertaining to him and his companies.8 8 The United States District Court for the District of New
Jersey granted respondent's motion to quash, holding that the
act of producing the documents had communicative aspects
which may incriminate him,8" and the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit affirmed. °
Justice Powell, writing for the majority, conducted a two-part
See id. at 413.
Id.
465 U.S. 605 (1984).
87 Id. at 606.
88 Id. at 606-07. The records sought in the third subpoena were objected to by
the respondents, and thus, became the basis of the suit. Those records requested
were:
(1) general ledgers; (2) general journals; (3) cash disbursement journals;
(4) petty cash books and vouchers; (5) purchase journals; (6) vouchers;
(7) paid bills; (8) invoices; (9) cash receipts journal; (10) billings; (11)
bank statements; (12) canceled checks and check stubs; (13) payroll
records; (14) contracts and copies of contracts, including all retainer
agreements; (15) financial statements; (16) bank deposit tickets; (17) retained copies of partnership income tax returns; (18) retained copies of
payroll tax returns; (19) accounts payable ledger; (20) accounts receivable ledger; (21) telephone company statement of calls and telegrams,
and all telephone toll slips; (22) records of all escrow, trust, or fiduciary
accounts maintained on behalf of clients; (23) safe deposit box records;
(24) records of all purchases and sales of all stocks and bonds; (25)
names and home addresses of all partners, associates, and employees;
(26) W-2 forms of each partner, associate, and employees; (27)
workpapers; and (28) copies of tax returns.
Id. at 607 n. 1.
89 Id. at 607-08. The district court required the respondent to produce only
those documents which were required by law to be kept or disclosed to a public
agency. See In re Grand Jury Empaneled March 19, 1980, 541 F. Supp. 1, 3 (D.NJ.
1981), aff d, 680 F.2d 327 (3d Cir. 1982), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. United
States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605 (1984).
90 In re Grand Jury Empaneled March 19, 1980, 680 F.2d 327 (3d Cir. 1982),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub noma. United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605 (1984).
84

85
86
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analysis to determine whether a fifth amendment violation existed.9" The Court began by reversing the court of appeals' ruling that the contents of a sole proprietor's business records were
absolutely protected.92 After stating that the fifth amendment
protects individuals from compelled self-incrimination,9 3 and
that the documents at issue were voluntarily prepared, 94 the
Court concluded that the compulsion element was absent and the
contents of the documents were not privileged. 9 5
The Court next applied the Fisher act of production analysis. 9 6 The Court deferred to the trial court's finding that the act
of producing the requested documents had testimonial aspects
incriminating to the respondent. 97 The majority noted that, unlike Fisher, the government failed to demonstrate that the existence, possession and authenticity of the papers were "foregone
conclusionj[s]." 9 8 The Court concluded that the respondent
could not, absent the granting of use immunity pursuant to the
federal statute, 9 9 be compelled to produce those documents. 10 0
91 Doe, 465 U.S. at 610-14.
92 See id. at 611. In support of that proposition, Justice Powell wrote:
Respondent does not contend that he prepared the documents involuntarily or that the subpoena would force him to restate, repeat, or affirm
the truth of their contents. The fact that the records are in respondent's
possession is irrelevant to the determination of whether the creation of
the records was compelled. We therefore hold that the contents of
those records are not privileged.
Id. at 611-12 (footnote omitted).
93 Id. at 610.
94 Id.

95 Id. at 610-11.
96 Id. at 612-14.
97 Id. at 613. The Court explained:
The District Court's finding essentially rests on its determination of factual issues. Therefore, we will not overturn that finding unless it has no
support in their record. Traditionally, we also have been reluctant to
disturb findings of fact in which two courts below have concurred. We
therefore decline to overturn the finding of the District Court in this
regard, where, as here, it has been affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Id. at 613-14 (citations omitted) (footnote omitted).
98 Id. at 614 n.13 (quoting Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 411 (1976)).
99 Id. at 615. The Court noted that use immunity could be granted pursuant to
two federal statutes. Id. Specifically, the Court stated that 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1982)
provides:
Whenever a witness refuses, on the basis of his privilege against selfincrimination, to testify or provide other information in a proceeding
before or ancillary to(1) a court or grand jury of the United States,
(2) api agency of the United States, or
(3) either House of Congress, a joint committee of the two Houses, or
a committee or a subcommittee of either House, and the person presid-
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In light of the fundamental shift in fifth amendment focus
from privacy concerns to the testimonial compulsion element inherent in the act of production, the United States Supreme Court
in Braswell v. United States 101 addressed the act of production anal-

ysis as it relates to a corporate custodian. The Court framed the
issue to be "whether the custodian of corporate records may resist a subpoena for such records on the ground that the act of
production would incriminate him in violation of the Fifth
Amendment."' 2 Although the collective entity rule precisely established that the fifth amendment does not extend to either artiing over the proceeding communicates to the witness an order issued
under this part, the witness may not refuse to comply with the order on
the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination; but no testimony or
other information compelled under the order (or any information directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or other information)
may be used against the witness in any criminal case, except a prosecution for perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to comply
with the order.
Doe, 465 U.S. at 615 n.14 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1982)). Additionally, the
Court noted that 18 U.S.C. § 6003 (1982) provides:
(a) In the case of any individual who has been or may be called to testify or provide other information at any proceeding before or ancillary
to a court of the United States or a grand jury of the United States, the
United States district court for the judicial district in which the proceeding is or may be held shall issue, in accordance with subsection (b) of
this section, upon the request of the United States attorney for such
district, an order requiring such individual to give testimony or provide
other information which he refuses to give or provide on the basis of his
privilege against self-incrimination, such order to become effective as
provided in section 6002 of this part.
(b) A United States attorney may, with approval of the Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney General, or any designated Assistant Attorney
General, request an order under subsection (a) of this section when in
his judgment(1) the testimony or other information from such individual may be
necessary to the public interest; and
(2) such individual has refused or is likely to refuse to testify or provide other information on the basis of his privilege against selfincrimination.
Doe, 465 U.S. at 615 n.14 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 6003 (1982)). See also Kastigar v.
United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972) (upholding the constitutionality of statutory use
immunity).
100 See Doe, 465 U.S. at 616. For a detailed discussion of the Doe decision, see
Case Comment, United States v. Doe and its Progeny:A Reevaluation of the Fifth Amendment's Application to Custodians of Corporate Records, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 793 (1986)
(authored by Glenn Gerena & Adalberto Jordan); Note, The Fifth Amendment and
Production of Documents After United States v. Doe, 66 B.U.L. REV. 95 (1986) (authored by Barbara Daniels Davis).
101 108 S. Ct. 2284 (1988).
102 See id. at 2286.
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ficial entities or the contents of business records, 0 3 the Court
had not, prior to Braswell, applied the 0Fisher/Doe
act of produc4
tion analysis to a corporate custodian.1

Writing for the five-person majority, ChiefJustice Rehnquist
initially pointed out that Braswell was a corporate custodian,
who, unlike the sole proprietor in Doe, could not assert a fifth
amendment privilege.'0 5 The Court explained that its fifth
amendment doctrine centered on a sharp distinction between individuals who may assert such a privilege and corporations or
other artificial entities, which may not.'0 6 After thoroughly examining the evolution of the collective entity doctrine in document production cases, the Court refused to extend its act of
production analysis to corporate custodians. 0 7 Because a corporate custodian possesses corporate records solely in a representative capacity, the Court reasoned that the act of producing such
records is an act of the corporation, to which fifth amendment
protections do not extend.'
Consequently, the Court concluded that a custodian cannot refuse to produce subpoenaed
corporate documents even if the act of production may have testimonial aspects which may incriminate him personally.'0 9
The Court found support for that conclusion in collective
entity cases decided prior to Fisher.' 0 Although recognizing that
those cases did not involve an act of production analysis,"' the
Court determined that "[t]he agency rationale undergirding the
See id. at 2287.
Id. Despite this lack of precedent, the Court noted that the petitioner asserted, "that his act of producing the documents has independent testimonial significance, which would incriminate him individually, and that the Fifth Amendment
prohibits government compulsion of that act." Id.
105 See id. at 2290.
106 Id.
107 Id. at 2292. In support of its position, the majority cited to justice Brennan's
concurring opinion in Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976). Braswell, 108 S.
Ct. at 2292 (citing Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 429 (1976) (Brennan, J.,
concurring)). In Fisher,Justice Brennan declined to join the majority's utilization of
the collective entity cases to support the position that an "act of production is not
testimonial." Id. (quoting Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 429-30 (1976)
(Brennan,J., concurring)). He did concede, however, that a corporate custodian is
compelled to respond to a subpoena regardless of the fact that the act of production may be incriminating. Id. (citing Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 429-30
(1976) (Brennan, J., concurring)).
108 Id. (citing Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976)).
109 Id.
1O Id. See, e.g., Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85 (1974); United States v. White,
322 U.S. 694 (1944); Dreier v. United States, 221 U.S. 394 (1911); Wilson v. United
States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911).
I11 Braswell, 108 S.Ct. at 2290.
103
104
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collective entity decisions, in which custodians asserted that production of entity records would incriminate them personally,
survives."' 12
The majority next rejected Braswell's argument that Fisher
required application of the act of production doctrine to a corporate custodian. 1 3 Faced with the task of balancing the act of production privilege afforded individuals with the collective entity
rule, the Court found the latter controlling." 4 The Court
deemed a corporate custodian to have waived his individual privilege against self-incrimination'" 5 and stated that production of
corporate records is not testimonial because such records are the
property of the entity and must be relinquished by the custodian
pursuant to his representative capacity.'' 6
The Court then addressed the argument petitioner had extrapolated from Curcio and Fisher." 7 Because Curcio precluded
the compulsion of testimony by a corporate custodian to the
whereabouts of the entity's records," I and Fisher adjudged the
act of production potentially testimonial," 9 the petitioner
claimed that the compelled production of corporate documents
invoked fifth amendment protections. 120 In rejecting petitioner's
argument, the majority stressed that Curcio prohibited the compulsion of oral testimony 12 ' and thus did not extend to Braswell,
122
who was not required to testify.
112

113

Id. at 2291.
Id. at 2290-91.

Id. at 2291. The Braswell Court stated:
[B]y virtue of their character and the rules of law applicable to them, the
books and papers are held subject to examination by the demanding
authority, the custodian has no privilege to refuse production although
their contents tend to [in]criminate him. In assuming their custody he
has accepted the incident obligation to permit inspection.
Id. at 2291 (quoting Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 382 (1911)).
115 See id. Relying on White, the Court declared, "documents of the organization
that are held by [custodians] in a representative rather than a personal capacity
cannot be the subject of the personal privilege against self-incrimination, even
though production of the papers might tend to incriminate them personally." Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2291 (quoting United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699 (1944))
(footnote omitted).
116 Id.
117 Id. at 2292-93.
118 Id. at 2293 (citing Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118 (1957)).
119 See Fisher v. United States, 391 U.S. 408, 410 (1974). See also text accompanyingsupra notes 71-85.
120 Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2293.
121 Id. (emphasis added). See Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118, 123-24
(1957).
122 Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2293-94.
114
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Chief Justice Rehnquist cited public policy reasons to support the Court's holding. 23 Emphasizing a need to prosecute
white-collar crime, 124 the Chief Justice warned that a contrary
holding would improperly impede law enforcement attempts to
obtain corporate records.' 2 5 He reasoned that because a corporation always acts through its agents, allowing a representative to
would preclude government access to
assert a personal privilege
26
corporate documents. 1

The Court rejected the suggested alternative of allowing the
corporation to designate a representative to produce documents
1 27
where the primary custodian faces potential incrimination.
The Court characterized this alternative as unrealistic. 128 Because the primary custodian arguably is the only person privy to
that apthe location of documents, the Court then concluded
129
pointing an alternate custodian would be futile.
The majority also rejected the alternative of granting statutory immunity to custodians who may be personally incriminated
by the act of production. 3 0 The Court stressed the significant
ramifications that would arise from such a procedure. 13 1 Specifi"cally, the Court noted both prohibition against use of the immunized testimony against the custodian and the government's
burden of proving that other evidence was derived from independent sources.' 3 2 The Court then determined that granting
would hamper the prosecution
immunity to corporate custodians
3
of white-collar crime.'

3

Id. at 2294.
Id. at 2294 n.9. The majority considered white-collar crime "the most serious
and all-pervasive crime problem in America today." Id. (citing Conyers, Corporate
and White-CollarCrime: A View by the Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Crime, 17 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 287, 288 (1980)).
125 Id. at 2294.
126 Id. Justice Rehnquist quoted White, which stated, "[w]ere the cloak of the
privilege to be thrown around these impersonal records and documents, effective
enforcement of many federal and state laws would be impossible." Braswell, 108 S.
Ct. at 2294 (quoting United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 700 (1944)).
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 Id. at 2294-95.
133 Id. at 2295. The majority dismissed the dissent's contention that validation of
an act of production privilege by corporate custodians would not undermine law
enforcement efforts focused upon those custodians because only the custodians' act
of production requires immunization. Chief Justice Rehnquist, however, posited
that the "burden of proving an independent source that a grant of immunity places
123
124
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The majority concluded by describing certain circumstances
where evidence of the custodian's act of production may not be
used against him personally. 3 4 While noting that the production
of documents is a corporate act not imputable to its custodian, 135
the Court recognized that a jury may infer that a custodian in a
prominent corporate position had incriminating knowledge of
the existence and contents of the documents." 6 The Court,
however, expressly declined to address the situation in which the
evidence leaves a jury no other alternative but to conclude that
3 7
the custodian produced the records.'
In a vigorous dissent, Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices
Brennan, Marshall, and Scalia denounced the majority's holding
that the collective entity rule automatically precludes fifth
3 8
amendment protection of a custodian's act of production.
Although agreeing with the majority that the fifth amendment
does not protect the contents of business records, the dissent
contended that Fisher protects an individual regardless of his employment status. I3 9 The dissent argued that Doe, which extended
fifth amendment protection to a sole proprietor's production of
documents, 40 mandated its extension to a corporate custodian
such as Braswell. 4 ' Justice Kennedy explained that Doe "did not
depend on who owned the papers, how they were created, or
what they said; instead, we rested on the fact that 'the act of producing the documents would involve testimonial self-

incrimination.'

"142

In so arguing, the dissent did not dispute the vitality of the
collective entity rule but rather challenged its application in light
of Fisher and Doe.' 43 Emphasizing that all prior collective entity
decisions concerned the contents of the corporate records, rather
than the constitutional ramifications of the act of their producon the Government could . . . have just such a deleterious effect on law enforcement efforts." Id. at 2295 n.10.
134 Id. at 2295.
'35

Id.

Id.
See id. at 2295 n. 11.
Id. at 2296 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
See id.Justice Kennedy focused on Braswell's contention that the fifth amendment protected him from forced production of records where "the act of production" will incriminate him. Id.
140 United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 613 (1984).
141 Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2297 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing United States v.
Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 613 (1984)).
142 Id. (quoting United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 613 (1984)).
143 See id.
136

17
138
139
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tion, 4 4 the dissent asserted that production is inescapably an individual act.' 4 5 In Justice Kennedy's view, the representative
capacity of the individual is irrelevant to the existence of a fifth
amendment privilege. 4 6 Noting both the subpoena's requirement that Braswell personally identify and deliver records and
the government's concession that Braswell's act of production involved testimonial assertions, Justice Kennedy asserted that such
production clearly represented an act personal to Braswell and
not to the corporation.147

Justice Kennedy rejected the majority's interpretation of
Curcio,' 48 objecting to its perceived distinction between oral testi-

mony and testimony in other forms. 14 Rather, Justice Kennedy
contended that the Curcio holding embraces all testimony,
through words or actions, which compels an individual to "disclose the contents of his own mind."' 150 He therefore concluded
that the disclosure of Braswell's personal knowledge concerning
the possession and location of the documents rendered his production testimonial.' 5 ' Braswell's act of production thus was tantamount to the oral1 5 2testimonial act granted fifth amendment
protection in

Curcio.

The dissent also disputed the majority's decision to render
evidence concerning the act of production inadmissible in a subsequent prosecution of the custodian. 15 3 In granting such protection, the dissent contended that the majority implicitly
acknowledged that the fifth amendment privilege protects the
undercuts
custodian individually. 154 Such an acknowledgement
"the necessary support for the majority's case."'' 55
Justice Kennedy further criticized the majority's public pol144 Id. at 2298 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). See Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S.
361 (1911). In Wilson, the Court rejected a custodian's claim of privilege based
upon his assertion that the contents of the corporate documents would incriminate
him. Id.at 363. The Court held that a state's visitorial power over a corporation
includes the ability to inspect corporate records. Id. at 385.
145 Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2298 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
146 Id.
147 Id.
148 Id. See Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118 (1957).
149 See Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2299 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
150 Id. (citation omitted). See supra note 61.
151 Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2299 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
152 Id.
153 Id. at 2299-2300 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
154 Id. at 2300 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
155

Id.
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icy analysis. 156 Reasoning that the scope of the fifth amendment
cannot be lessened by a desire to facilitate prosecutions, 157 Justice Kennedy argued that the privilege against self-incrimination
attaches universally and cannot be limited to situations in which
it will not impede a governmental investigation.'" 8
Finally, the dissent suggested that the granting of use immunity 159 would not impede governmental investigations because
such grants of immunity would not deny governmental access to
subpoenaed documents but would merely protect the individual
producing them.' 60 In rejecting the majority's contention that
the acceptance of a corporate custodial position necessitates a
waiver of fifth amendment privileges,' 6 1 Justice Kennedy concluded that the mere assumption of an employment position can16 2
not waive individual constitutional guarantees.
The Supreme Court long ago recognized, in Boyd, that the
fifth amendment bars the compelled production of one's private
papers. 6 3 In analyzing that privacy-based, inherently personal
privilege in subsequent cases, the Court refused to extend its
protections to collective entities such as corporations. 1 64 Moreover, the Court declined to allow individual representatives of
such entities to assert a personal privilege based on the incriminating contents of entity-owned documents. 6 5 Those collective
entity decisions were faithful to the fundamental principle enunciated in Boyd: that privacy concerns predominate the fifth
amendment.
Almost a century after Boyd, the Court in Fisher abruptly
refocused its fifth amendment analysis, abandoning its privacybased rationale in favor of determining whether the act of proSee id. at 2301 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
See supra note 99 and accompanying text (discussing federal use immunity
statutes).
160 Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2301 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy contended that only the individual invoking fifth amendment privileges would be protected. Id. Thus, the government would still be able to acquire the records and use
the contents of the records against anyone. Id.
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 For a discussion of the Boyd decision, see text accompanying supra notes 2633.
164 See, e.g., United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944); Wilson v. United States,
221 U.S. 361 (1911); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
165 See id.
156
157
158
159

324

SETON HALL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 19:303

duction involves testimonial compulsion. 6 6 Absent such testimonial compulsion, Fisher and Doe mandate that no fifth
amendment, protections can arise, regardless of the personally incriminating nature of the contents of the documents.' 67
Braswell required the Court to apply its act of production
doctrine to a collective entity scenario. The precise issue facing
the Court was whether a custodian, despite having no personal
privilege arising from the contents of the subpoenaed documents, could nevertheless invoke the fifth amendment if the act
of producing those documents might incriminate him personally.' 68 Purporting to find the collective entity doctrine controlling, the five-person majority answered the issue in the
negative.' 6 9
While certainly foreseeable given Fisher's radical departure
from the Court's previous fifth amendment jurisprudence, Braswell is not a logically compelled extension of Fisher. By shifting
the focus from privacy concerns underlying the fifth amendment
to the act of production at its very surface, Fisher certainly made
Braswell possible. And because Fisher arose in an individual
rather than corporate context, it postponed the irreconcilable
conflict between the rule it announced and the collective entity
doctrine.
That conflict was squarely presented in Braswell. Faced with
the Hobson's choice of misapplying Fisher and jeopardizing
white-collar criminal investigations, the Court predictably chose
the former. As a result, corporate custodians have lost not only
the substantive privacy right denied by Fisher, but have also been
denied the skeletal freedom from testimonial document production conferred by that decision.
Although correctly recognizing that corporate records are
not protected by the fifth amendment, the Braswell Court conspicuously misapplied that concept, concealing the real issue behind
70
a seemingly endless recitation of prior collective entity cases.'
The collective entity rule was formulated in a series of carefully
conceived decisions based upon the understanding that an individual does not have a privacy interest in the contents of entityowned documents.' 7 ' The Court later recognized in Doe that a
166
167
168
169
170
171

See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 410 (1976).
See Fisher, 425 U.S. at 409; United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 612 (1984).
Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2286.
Id. at 2292.
Id. at 2288-92.
See supra note 164.
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sole proprietor could claim a fifth amendment privilege if the act
of producing documents belonging to his business would prove
personally incriminating.' 72 While Doe reaffirmed that the act of
producing documents is inherently a personal act triggering fifth
amendment scrutiny, the Braswell Court nonetheless relied on the
collective entity rule to conclude that any acts of a corporate custodian must necessarily be attributed to the corporation. This
analysis ignores the obvious fact that the act of production protected under Fisher and Doe is personal to the custodian. Thus, by
extending the collective entity rule beyond its intended purpose,
the Braswell Court has effectively stripped even that minimal fifth
amendment privilege from an entire class of individuals.
The cornerstone of the fifth amendment is its protection of
individuals from compelled self-incrimination. If Fisher hung that
protection by a slender reed the reed has now snapped. By holding that a corporate representative enjoys no individual privilege
even where his compelled actions personally incriminate him,
Braswell disavows the fifth amendment's fundamental purpose.
Consequently, Randy Braswell represents a class of citizensnamely, corporate custodians-who lack the individual protections of the fifth amendment extended to others.
Thomas P. Scrivo
172

United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 612-13 (1984).

